Mainstream defense desks love a good Hollywood thriller. Give them a leaked intelligence report about Iranian hit squads targeting former American officials, and they will run with the "Fair Game" headline for a week straight.
Firstpost and the rest of the foreign policy echo chamber want you to believe Tehran is a suicidal, irrational actor itching to trigger a direct shooting war with the United States. They frame every covert plot as an imminent countdown to global catastrophe. Meanwhile, you can read related events here: The Night Brazil Held Its Breath Over Two Million Votes.
They are completely missing the point.
Having spent fifteen years analyzing asymmetric deterrence models and watching Western intelligence briefings get spun into cable news hysteria, I have seen policymakers burn billions on defensive postures built on a fundamental misreading of Persian statecraft. When Tehran leaks, whispers, or clumsily orchestrates plots against former officials like Mike Pompeo, John Bolton, or Donald Trump, they are not preparing for total war. They are trying to avoid one. To explore the complete picture, we recommend the excellent article by The New York Times.
The Lazy Consensus of the "Irrational Actor"
The standard media narrative relies on a comfortable, binary myth: Western powers operate on cold, rational deterrence, while the Islamic Republic of Iran operates on blind ideological vengeance.
Look at the coverage surrounding the recent reports of Iranian retaliation plots following deadly strikes against their commanders. The lazy consensus assumes a linear escalation ladder. America strikes a high-value target. Iran vows revenge. Therefore, Iran will inevitably execute a high-profile assassination on American soil, forcing Washington to flatten Tehran.
This logic ignores forty years of operational history.
If the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) actually wanted to trigger a kinetic war with the Pentagon, they would not be hiring amateur middlemen, compromised cartel associates, or clumsy operatives in Washington D.C. and New York—plots that the FBI and Department of Justice routinely roll up before a single shot is fired.
Think about that for a second.
The Quds Force is one of the most sophisticated clandestine networks on earth. They have spent decades building deeply embedded sleeper cells, complex financial front companies, and lethal proxy armies from Beirut to Sanaa. Yet, the plots targeting former U.S. officials are consistently noisy, detectable, and almost always intercepted.
Why? Because in intelligence tradecraft, a foiled plot is often more useful than a successful one.
Deterrence Through Psychological Paranoia
To understand what Tehran is doing, you have to understand the exact mechanism of asymmetric psychological deterrence.
Following the January 2020 assassination of Qasem Soleimani, the traditional rules of state-on-state engagement broke down. Historically, nation-states maintained an unspoken gentlemen's agreement: you can kill soldiers, you can bomb infrastructure, and you can fund insurgents, but you do not openly vaporize top-tier uniformed generals of a sovereign state during peacetime.
When Washington crossed that Rubicon, Tehran faced an impossible strategic dilemma.
- Conventional retaliation was suicide. Launching a massive, direct missile barrage that killed hundreds of American troops would guarantee the total destruction of Iran's regime and economy.
- Doing nothing was also suicide. Absorbing the blow without a credible response would destroy Tehran's deterrence credibility among its own proxies—Hezbollah, the Houthis, and Iraqi militias—signaling open season on Iranian leadership.
Enter the "Fair Game" doctrine.
By shifting the threat matrix from conventional military bases to the personal physical security of individual American policymakers, Tehran found a brilliant, low-cost pressure valve. They realized they do not need to actually kill a former Secretary of State to achieve their strategic objective. They only need to make that official spend the rest of their life riding in armored motorcades, surrounded by twenty-four-hour Secret Service details, checking under their cars, and looking over their shoulders at every restaurant.
Cost imposition. That is the real game.
Every dollar the U.S. government spends protecting former officials, every intelligence asset diverted from tracking Chinese cyber operations or Russian troop movements to monitor threats against retired politicians, and every ounce of psychological stress inflicted on Washington's hawkish elite is a massive return on investment for Tehran. It forces American decision-makers to internalize a brutal personal calculation before they ever sign off on another targeted strike: If I approve this kill order today, will my family and I ever walk down a street unguarded again?
Why Mainstream Analysts Ask the Wrong Questions
If you look at the questions dominating public discourse right now, you will see how deeply the public is being misled by surface-level reporting.
"Can Iran actually pull off an assassination on U.S. soil?"
This is the wrong question. Of course they have the theoretical capability if they burn their deepest, most compartmentalized assets. The real question is: What happens to the Iranian regime the exact minute a former U.S. official dies on American pavement?
Tehran knows the answer. The political pressure in Washington would become instantly uncontrollable. No American president—Democrat or Republican—could survive politically without launching a devastating, regime-ending military campaign against Iran. Tehran's supreme leadership values regime survival above all else. They are ruthless, cynical, and brutal, but they are not suicidal.
"Why doesn't the U.S. just strike Iran directly to make the threats stop?"
Another deeply flawed premise. You cannot bomb an asymmetric threat out of existence without committing to a full-scale ground invasion, and nobody in the Pentagon has the appetite or the bandwidth for another endless Middle Eastern quagmire while simultaneously managing Eastern Europe and the Indo-Pacific. Kinetic strikes against Iran only validate Tehran's internal narrative, rally their fractured domestic population around the flag, and accelerate their nuclear breakout timeline.
"Are these threats proof that diplomacy is dead?"
Actually, it is the exact opposite. In Middle Eastern geopolitical bargaining, maximum rhetorical hostility and covert posturing almost always precede back-channel negotiations. Tehran uses the threat of personal retaliation as leverage at the negotiating table in places like Oman and Qatar. They are creating a crisis that only they can turn off, hoping to trade a stand-down order on assassination plots for sanctions relief or tacit U.S. restraint in the region.
The Anatomy of a Manufactured Crisis
Let us strip away the sensationalism and look at the cold mechanics of how these intelligence leaks actually operate.
When U.S. intelligence agencies detect chatter or operational movement regarding an Iranian plot, the decision to leak that information to major news outlets is rarely accidental. It serves a dual purpose for Washington as well.
First, it acts as a public warning shot to Tehran: We see your operators, we have penetrated your communications, and if you cross the line, we have already pre-sold the justification for war to the American public.
Second, it locks the White House into a rigid posture. Hawks in Washington love these leaks because they make diplomatic compromises politically toxic. How can an administration negotiate nuclear restrictions or unfreeze assets with a regime actively trying to murder former American cabinet members? The leak itself becomes a weapon used by domestic political factions to sabotage de-escalation.
Imagine a scenario where Tehran quietly halts all operational planning against U.S. officials tomorrow. Would the Secret Service details stand down? No. Would the threat level drop? No. Because the mere existence of past plots permanently alters the threat assessment. Tehran has already banked the strategic win. They have permanently raised the personal cost of American interventionism without having to fire a single bullet on U.S. soil.
The Heavy Hitters Agree—Even If Cable News Won't Admit It
Serious military strategists and intelligence historians have understood this dynamic for decades, even if it rarely makes it onto television panels.
Look at the foundational work of Thomas Schelling on the strategy of conflict and brinkmanship. Schelling demonstrated that the most effective coercion relies not on executing a threat, but on creating a shared perception of risk that spirals just out of reach. By convincing Washington that the IRGC is on the verge of acting out of "irrational" vengeance, Tehran manipulates America's risk aversion.
Similarly, regional experts like Vali Nasr and Trita Parsi have repeatedly documented how the Islamic Republic's security apparatus operates through calibrated escalation—always pushing right up to the red line, testing the tensile strength of American resolve, and pulling back just before triggering an existential conflict.
Even within the Pentagon's own wargaming circles, the consensus is clear: Iran's asymmetric doctrine is fundamentally defensive in its grand strategy, even when its tactics look aggressively offensive. They use proxies, cyberattacks, and assassination plots to keep the fight as far away from Iranian borders as possible. If the battleground is a courtroom in Brooklyn or a security detail in Virginia, the battleground is not Tehran.
The Uncomfortable Blind Spot in My Own Argument
Now, let us be brutally honest about the flaw in this contrarian thesis. Deterrence theory works brilliantly on paper, right up until human incompetence ruins the math.
The single greatest danger in Tehran's "managed paranoia" strategy is operational friction.
When you outsource covert operations to criminal syndicates, cut-outs, and low-level mercenaries to maintain plausible deniability, you lose command-and-control discipline. A rogue operative might misread an order. A hired gun might get lucky and slip past a security perimeter when he was only meant to conduct surveillance. An IRGC commander operating under intense domestic pressure might decide to take matters into his own hands to score political points in Tehran.
History is littered with wars started by accidents that nobody intended. The 1914 assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand was carried out by a disorganized cell of young nationalists that nearly botched the job entirely—until a wrong turn by a driver handed them history on a silver platter.
Tehran is playing with live ammunition in a crowded room, betting that its operatives are just competent enough to scare Washington, and just incompetent enough to get caught before starting World War III. That is a razor-thin margin for error.
How to Actually Neutralize the Threat
If Washington wants to break this cycle, continuing to amplify every intercepted plot as an existential crisis is the worst possible move. Panic is the exact currency Tehran is trying to mint.
Instead, policymakers need to execute three cold, unsentimental shifts:
- Starve the psychological operation of oxygen. Stop turning every FBI disruption into a week-long media spectacle. Handle the counterintelligence quietly, prosecute the operatives silently, and deny Tehran the global propaganda victory of looking like an unstoppable bogeyman haunting American streets.
- Redefine the deterrence equation. Make it unmistakably clear through private, unvarnished back-channels that the U.S. will no longer distinguish between an Iranian state operative and a hired criminal proxy. If a proxy pulls a trigger, the response hits IRGC infrastructure directly—not empty warehouses in the desert, and not low-level militias in Iraq.
- Separate tactical counterterrorism from grand strategy. Do not let covert assassination plots dictate broader diplomatic or military posture in the Middle East. Treat them as a permanent, manageable counterintelligence problem—just like Russian espionage or Chinese intellectual property theft—rather than a hair-trigger tripwire for regional war.
Tehran wants Washington reactive, paranoid, and trapped in an endless cycle of defensive posturing. The moment you stop flinching at the shadow on the wall, the entire strategy collapses.